19 F.3d 1429

1

Tullio J. Malagrida (Malagrida) appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Trust (the Trustees). Finding no error, we affirm.

2

* This appeal involves a former coal miner’s eligibility for certain pension benefits from the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Trust (1950 Pension Trust). Thus, before discussing the particular facts of this appeal, it is helpful to begin with a discussion of the eligibility requirements for pension benefits.

3

* The 1950 Pension Trust is one of several irrevocable employee benefits trusts, collectively referred to as the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds. The 1950 Pension Trust was established under Article XX of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 to fund the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (1950 Pension Plan).

4

Article II. B of the 1950 Pension Plan indicates that retirement pension benefits shall be provided to miners who have: (1) attained age fifty-five; (2) retired from the coal industry prior to December 31, 1975; and (3) established either twenty years of classified service, including the five years of signatory service after May 28, 1946, or ten years of signatory service, including at least three years of signatory service after December 31, 1970.

5

The 1950 Pension Plan defines a year of classified service as any calendar year in which the miner worked a minimum of 1,000 hours in a job classified in the then-existing wage agreement. If the participant does not have sufficient hours for a full year’s classified service credit, credit may be awarded in one-fourth year increments. Classified service may be either signatory or non-signatory. Employment with an employer signatory to the wage agreement then in effect is “signatory service.”

6

In assessing a participant’s credit for years of classified service, the 1950 Pension Plan gives one year credit “for any calendar year in which he served in the military of the United States.” (J.A. 166). However, such credit applies only when:

7

[T]he participant returned to work in a classified job within twelve (12) months after his date of separation from the military service, unless he was precluded from doing so by service connected sickness, accident, or other disability, and returns to work in a classified job when no longer precluded by such disability.

8

Id. (emphasis added). Finally, such credit qualifies as “signatory service” if the employer for whom the participant worked immediately prior to and after his military service was a “signatory to the … wage agreement then in effect.” (J.A. 167). Otherwise, the credit for military service would be “non-signatory.”

9

Malagrida is a former coal miner who last worked in the bituminous coal industry in 1953. On December 28, 1979, Malagrida applied for pension benefits from the 1950 Pension Plan. Because Malagrida ceased working in the coal industry in 1953, he had to establish twenty years of classified service, including five years of signatory service after 1946, to qualify for the pension benefits.

10

In order to process Malagrida’s application for pension benefits, the Trustees obtained a copy of his Social Security Itemized Statement of Earnings (Wage Record). Based upon this and other information, such as signatory status of employers and Malagrida’s job classification with such employers, the Trustees ultimately awarded Malagrida sixteen and one half years of service credit.1 The Trustees thus found Malagrida ineligible for pension benefits under the 1950 Pension Plan. In reaching this conclusion, the Trustees denied any credit for Malagrida’s military service, reasoning that he did not “return to a classified job in the coal industry within twelve months of discharge and was not prevented from doing so by a service connected sickness or disability.” (J.A. 70).

11

Malagrida appealed the Trustee’s denial of credit for military service, asserting that he was entitled to additional pension credit for his military service from May 31, 1942, to September 30, 1945. Specifically, Malagrida contended that, after his discharge from the United States Army on September 30, 1945, he began working for Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates (Eastern Gas) in March 1946, or at least by September 1946. To support this assertion, Malagrida submitted statements from several former co-workers, as well as other evidence, summarized below.

12

Specifically, Malagrida submitted the following statements from former co-workers: (1) a statement from Burliss Atkinson indicating that Malagrida worked for Eastern Gas in July, August, September, and October 1946; (2) a statement from Fred Hill indicating that Malagrida worked for Eastern Gas from June 1945 to 1953; (3) a statement from Paul White indicating that he worked with Malagrida at Eastern Gas from April 2, 1946, to August 26, 1946; and (4) a statement from Edwin Lewis indicating that Malagrida returned to work before October 1946. Malagrida also supplied other evidence to support his contention that he had returned to work before October 1946, including: (1) photographs of a sign which Malagrida claimed was erected at Eastern Gas in 1946 and which Malagrida supposedly helped erect before October 1946; (2) a contract dated September 24, 1946, which indicates that he purchased property from J.H. Lilly Land Company. Malagrida claimed that he would not have been able to purchase this property if he had not been employed by that time.

13

After reviewing all the evidence submitted by Malagrida, the Trustees concluded that Malagrida had failed to establish that he returned to employment in the coal industry within twelve months of his military discharge, i.e., by October 1, 1946. In reaching this conclusion, the Trustees relied upon Malagrida’s Wage Record, which did not list earnings for the period between April 1, 1942 and September 30, 1946. In addition, the employment records supplied by Eastern Associated Coal Company (Eastern Associated) indicated that Malagrida did not begin working for Eastern Gas until October 27, 1946, some thirteen months after leaving military service.2 Other documents supplied by Eastern Associated reinforced this conclusion. For example, Eastern Associated supplied the Trustees with an employment card, bearing Malagrida’s signature and dated October 25, 1946. The card listed Malagrida’s last employer as the U.S. Army and it noted that he left his last employer on September 30, 1945. In addition, an earnings card indicated that Malagrida was employed on October 28, 1946, and that he earned $339.10 for the second half of October through December 1946.

14

Thus, based upon Malagrida’s Wage Record and employment records from Eastern Associated, the Trustees concluded that Malagrida was not entitled to service credit for his military service because he had not returned to work within twelve months after leaving military service. Since Malagrida only had sixteen and one half years of credited service, the Trustees denied his pension application.

15

On May 24, 1990, Malagrida filed suit against the Trustees in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, alleging the wrongful denial of pension benefits from the 1950 Pension Trust. In their answer, the Trustees denied that Malagrida met the applicable eligibility requirements for pension benefits under the 1950 Pension Plan. The Trustees also stated that their decision to deny Malagrida’s pension application was supported by substantial evidence, and was not an abuse of discretion. On September 23, 1991, the Trustees moved for summary judgment. On October 21, 1991, the district court denied summary judgment and remanded the action to the Trustees so that Malagrida could submit new evidence regarding his claim for benefits.

16

In January 1992, Malagrida submitted the statements of David Greer and Willard Lester to support his claim that he returned to work within twelve months of his military discharge. Lester and Greer stated that they had personal knowledge that Malagrida returned to classified employment in the summer of 1946. The Trustees, after reviewing these statements, as well as the entire record before them, again concluded that Malagrida failed to establish his entitlement to pension credit for his military service. Thus, the Trustees again denied Malagrida’s application for benefits from the 1950 Pension Trust.

17

On October 19, 1992, the Trustees filed another motion for summary judgment. In response, Malagrida claimed that the evidence before the district court created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Malagrida returned to work in the coal industry before October, 1946, i.e., within one year after leaving the military. On January 7, 1993, the district court again denied the Trustees’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Malagrida’s evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact.

18

Several days later, the parties filed a joint motion to continue the trial date that was set for January 26, 1993. The parties indicated in their motion that there was a dispute regarding the proper standard of review to be applied to the Trustees’ decision to deny pension benefits to Malagrida. The parties requested that the district court give the Trustees an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of their summary judgment motion setting forth their position regarding the proper standard of review. The district court granted the joint motion on January 15, 1993, and continued the trial date pending an order by the court.

19

On January 19, 1993, the Trustees filed a motion requesting that the district court reconsider their summary judgment motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). Although the district court gave Malagrida the opportunity to respond to the Trustees’ motion for reconsideration, he failed to do so. On February 24, 1993, the district court granted the Trustees’ motion for reconsideration, vacated its order of January 7, 1993, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustees.

20

Malagrida appeals.

21

As a preliminary matter, the Trustees suggest that we must determine whether the district court properly granted the Trustees’ motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). The district court granted this motion after apparently determining that, under the appropriate standard of review for Trustee decisions regarding pension eligibility, genuine issues of material fact did not preclude summary judgment. The district court clearly had the authority to reconsider its earlier denial of summary judgment.

22

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party … from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect…. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reason[ ](1) … not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

23

Our sister circuits disagree on whether Rule 60(b)(1) motions allow a district court to review allegedly erroneous conclusions of law.

24

Some circuits believe the rule does not allow a district court to review purported legal errors. See, e.g., McKnight v. U.S. Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir.1984); Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (1st Cir.1971). These courts reason that “[t]he appropriate way to seek review of alleged legal errors is by timely appeal; a 60(b) motion is not a substitute for an appeal or a means to enlarge indirectly the time for appeal.” McKnight, 726 F.2d at 338.

25

Other circuits disagree. For example, the Ninth Circuit takes the position that “errors of law are cognizable under Rule 60(b).” Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1982). Some circuits take a bifurcated approach, allowing a district court to review mistakes of law if the motion for reconsideration is filed within the time for filing an appeal. Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.1983). Fortunately, this split among the circuits has no application to the present case.

26

By its express terms, Rule 60(b)(1) applies only to final orders. In the present case, however, the order which the Trustees requested the district court to reconsider was not final. Instead, the Trustees filed their Rule 60(b)(1) motion after the district court denied their motion for summary judgment. “Generally, [the] denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final decision and no appeal lies from it.” Harrison v. Coweta Co., 5 F.3d 507, 509 (11th Cir.1993), citing United States v. Florian, 312 U.S. 656 (1941). We have previously recognized that “[a]n interlocutory order is subject to reconsideration at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment.” Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, 936 F.2d 1462, 1469 (4th Cir.1991).3 Thus, the district court clearly had authority to reconsider its prior denial of the Trustees’ motion for summary judgment.

27

Turning to the merits, Malagrida argues that the district court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of the Trustees. Malagrida reasons that he presented evidence suggesting that he resumed work within twelve months after leaving military service. If this evidence is true, Malagrida would be entitled to pension benefits. Because the evidence conflicts on the issue of when Malagrida returned to work after leaving the military, Malagrida concludes that a genuine issue of material fact existed, thereby precluding summary judgment. We disagree.

28

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a court must limit its review of a trustee’s decision concerning eligibility for pension benefits for an abuse of discretion if the pension plan grants the trustee discretionary powers to determine eligibility. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989). The 1950 Pension Plan provides that the Trustees shall have “full and final determination as to all issues concerning eligibility for benefits.” (J.A. 169). We have previously held that the identical language afforded Trustees the discretion to determine benefits’ eligibility and, therefore, that the abuse of discretion standard of review applied. Boyd v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir.1990) (reviewing the 1970 Pension Plan). Other courts agree. Baker v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers Association Health and Retirement Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir.1991) (reviewing the 1950 Pension Plan). Accordingly, in the present case the district court’s analysis was limited to determining whether the Trustees abused their discretion in deciding that Malagrida was ineligible for pension benefits.

29

Under this standard of review, a court must affirm the trustee’s decision “if it is the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Baker, 929 F.2d at 1144. In addition, a court must “focus on the evidence before the trustees at the time of their final decision and … not … hold a de novo factual hearing on the question of the applicant’s eligibility.” LeFebre v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 747 F.2d 197, 204 (4th Cir.1984).4 Also, if the record contains conflicting credible evidence, a court “cannot substitute [its] judgment for that of the [trustee]. [The] review is at an end when [the court] conclude[s] … there is substantial evidence to support the [trustee’s conclusion]….” Hamrick v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir.1982).

30

In the present case, the Trustees could deny Malagrida his pension benefits only if they determined that he did not “return to work in a classified job within twelve months after his date of separation from the military service.” (J.A. 166). Substantial evidence supports the Trustees’ decision that Malagrida failed to meet this requirement. Specifically, the Wage Record, as well as employment records supplied by Eastern Associated, indicates that Malagrida failed to resume work in the coal industry until October 28, 1946, some thirteen months after his military discharge. As we have noted, the presumptive accuracy of Social Security Administration wage records “survives the offering of contradictory evidence and thereafter may itself constitute substantial evidence that no wages were paid.” Breeden v. Wineberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir.1974).

31

Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence to support the Trustees’ conclusion that Malagrida had not resumed employment in the coal industry within one year of his military discharge and, therefore, was not entitled to pension benefits. Thus, the Trustees did not abuse their discretion and the district court could not disturb their eligibility decision. Consequently, we conclude that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Trustees even though Malagrida presented evidence to rebut the wage and employment records.

32

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the district court is affirmed.