60 F.3d 834

MEMORANDUM**

William R. Smith appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his action seeking declaratory relief regarding his claimed nontaxpayer status under the Internal Revenue laws and injunctive relief regarding the assessment and collection of federal income taxes for tax years 1990 and 1991. Smith contends the district court erred by removing the action from state to federal court, substituting the United States as a defendant, and dismissing the action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm.

Smith contends the district court erred by removing the action from state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441(a). This contention lacks merit because a federal question was presented on the face of the complaint. See Milne Employees Ass’n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).

Smith contends the district court erred by substituting the United States as a defendant in place of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees Carolyn Leonard and Paul Hoggatt, because Leonard and Hoggatt acted outside the scope of their employment when they sent Smith a notice of deficiency for 1990 and 1991. This contention lacks merit because the essential effect of the declaratory and injunctive relief sought would be against the United States. See Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2993 (1993).

Finally, Smith contends the district court erred by dismissing his action for failure to state a claim. Smith sought (1) a declaration that he is not a taxpayer and (2) an injunction against assessment and collection of federal income taxes. He claimed that his lumber sales were not taxable activity because he did not receive compensation in excess of the fair market value of the lumber. The district court correctly determined that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7421(a), barred Smith’s claims. See Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 535-37 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief with respect to tax or to enjoin assessment or collection of tax).

AFFIRMED.

MEMORANDUM**

Edward M. Molsone, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his first degree murder conviction. Molsone contends that his confession to the murder was involuntary. He asserts hat his confession was coerced by police threats that he would go to the gas chamber if he did not confess. This contention lacks merit. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253, and we affirm.1

The decision whether to grant or deny a petition for habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994). We review the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession de novo. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1985); Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992). A state court’s factual conclusions, however, are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). See Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415.

Historical or subsidiary facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness even though they may be dispositive of a constitutional claim. See Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415. “‘To be sure, subsidiary factual questions, such as … whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant … are entitled to the Sec. 2254(d) presumption [of correctness].”‘ Id. (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 112). Moreover, a state trial court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the Sec. 2254(d) presumption of correctness. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114; see also Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 727 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986).

Here, Molsone moved to suppress the confession and an evidentiary hearing was held to determine the admissibility of the confession. After hearing testimony from the police officers, Molsone, and the codefendants, the state trial court found that the validity of the confession was a question of credibility, and that all constitutional requirements had been satisfied. Molsone was afforded a full evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of his confession. His testimony was directly contradictory to that of the police officers. The officers testified that they did not make any threats or promises, but only told Molsone, in response to his inquiry, the range of penalties available for first degree murder with special circumstances.

The state trial judge was required to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial judge’s credibility determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 727. Because the trial court’s determination is fairly supported by the record, see Miller, 474 U.S. at 117, the factual conclusions are entitled to a presumption of correctness under Sec. 2254(d), see Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415.

Accordingly, we find that Molsone’s confession to first degree murder was not coerced or involuntary, and the district court properly denied Molsone’s Sec. 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 112-14; Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1451.

AFFIRMED.