60 F.3d 834

MEMORANDUM*

Petitioner Sultan Mohammad Daud Roadwall petitions this Court to review the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s finding that he was deportable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a). We grant the petition for review and instruct the BIA to remand the matter to the IJ for further proceedings on Roadwall’s request for discretionary relief.

Roadwall is a native and citizen of Afghanistan who entered the United States as a refugee in 1981. He received an adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 1986, he was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to two years imprisonment. The INS issued an Order to Show Cause on December 27, 1987, charging him with being deportable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(4). Roadwall petitioned for (1) Waiver of Deportation, (2) Suspension of Deportation, (3) Political Asylum, (4) Withholding of Deportation, and (5) Voluntary Departure in the Alternative.

Although he had been present for three prior hearings before the IJ, Roadwall failed timely to appear for a continuation of his deportation proceedings scheduled for January 26, 1989, at 8:30 a.m. His counsel was present at the hearing, but could offer no explanation for her client’s absence other than to suggest that he might have had car trouble. The IJ determined that Roadwall had not contacted the court, nor was he present outside the courtroom. At 8:55 a.m., the IJ ordered Roadwall deported, concluding that he had abandoned all applications for relief by his failure to appear.

Roadwall arrived at the courthouse shortly after 10:00 a.m., claiming that he had in fact experienced car trouble, had taken a taxi to the courthouse, and had been unable to reach his attorney’s office when he called her. The IJ denied Roadwall’s verbal motion to reopen, which was made by his attorney that same morning.

Roadwall’s attorney submitted a written motion to reopen later that day. The motion was supported by affidavits from Roadwall, his sister (who had been driving Roadwall to the courthouse when her car broke down), and his attorney. The affidavit of Roadwall’s attorney indicated that the telephone at her office has not been working properly and would have prevented Roadwall from reaching her office by phone. Roadwall also submitted a receipt for auto repair, a taxi receipt, and a note from the telephone repairman, all dated January 26, 1989.

The IJ denied Roadwall’s written motion to reopen and Roadwall appealed. The BIA concluded that, on the record before the IJ at the time she rendered her decision (i.e., before Roadwall had reached the courthouse), the IJ properly found that Roadwall had not demonstrated reasonable cause for his absence.

The BIA, however, treated Roadwall’s motion to reopen as a motion to remand. The BIA may remand for a hearing to allow a respondent to attempt to establish reasonable cause for his failure to appear for a hearing, but only if the explanation and supporting material considered on appeal, if left uncontroverted, would meet the criteria for a motion to reopen. The requirements for a motion to remand are essentially the same as those for a motion to reopen. Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir.1987). When the basis for a motion to reopen is that the IJ held a hearing in absentia, the petitioner must establish that he had reasonable cause for his absence from the proceedings. Matter of Haim, Interim Decision 3060 (BIA1988). If the petitioner had reasonable cause for failing to appear, the motion will be granted. Matter of Ruiz, Interim Decision 3116 (BIA1989).

The BIA concluded that the evidence proffered by Roadwall, even if left uncontroverted, did not establish reasonable cause for his absence. The Board emphasized that Roadwall had allowed himself only 30 minutes to reach the courthouse, which it concluded was insufficient to reasonably ensure his appearance. Thus, under these circumstances, the mechanical breakdown was not reasonable cause.

The denial of a motion to reopen (which, as is noted above, is treated the same as a motion to remand) is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Hernandez-Vivas v. INS, 23 F.3d 1557, 1560 (9th Cir.1994). However, we review de novo the INS’s construction of the definition of “reasonable cause” set forth in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b). Id. But, in conducting this de novo review, we accord considerable deference to the INS’s interpretation. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). Nevertheless, even according the required deference, we conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in dismissing Roadwall’s appeal.

The Board’s conclusion that 30 minutes was inadequate for Roadwall to ensure his appearance at the hearing is mere conjecture. As Roadwall argues before us, the BIA was unaware if he lived sufficiently close to the courthouse to ensure his presence at the hearing in significantly less time than 30 minutes. Although we make no finding on this point, we believe that the BIA’s conclusion that 30 minutes was inadequate travel time was unsubstantiated and therefore arbitrary.

Roadwall provided substantiated evidence of a mechanical breakdown of his car, which would indicate that he in fact had reasonable cause for his failure timely to appear for his hearing. Given the severity of the sanction the Government seeks to impose in this case, and the considerable evidence Roadwall has proffered to support his position, we conclude that this matter should be remanded to the IJ for further deportation proceedings. Accordingly, Roadwall’s petition is

GRANTED.

MEMORANDUM**

Richard S. Morda appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his action for failure to state claim and on res judicata grounds. Morda asserts violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. Sec.1961-1968, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and supplemental state claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291,1 and we affirm.

Morda contends that defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when they assumed conservatorship of his mother’s estate and mishandled the estate’s assets. Morda brought this action in federal court after a state court removed Morda as the trustee of the estate, and upheld the validity of defendant Scott as the estate’s trustee.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Morda’s RICO claim on several grounds. First, Morda’s complaint fails to state a claim under RICO because it fails to allege that defendants conducted an “enterprise” that was separate and apart from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United Energy Mgmt. Sys., 837 F.2d 356, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1988).

Second, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege that defendants engaged in racketeering acts as defined by section 1961(1). See Rothman v. Vedder Park Mgmt., 912 F.2d 315, 316-17 (9th Cir. 1990) (RICO claim dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege predicate acts of mail and wire fraud); Alan Neuman Productions Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988), (RICO claim fails because mail/wire fraud allegations “entirely general”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858 (1989).

Third, it appears that Morda is seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction under RICO to relitigate a state law matter. Morda previously had appeared in state court where he was represented by counsel, and had presented evidence as to Scott’s alleged misuse of the trust’s assets. Accordingly, his claims as to the propriety of Scott’s position as conservator and trustee of the estate are barred by collateral estoppel. See Los Angles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (state law determines preclusive effect of prior state court judgment involving either claim or issue preclusion in subsequent federal proceeding), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 24 Cal. App. 4th 327, 346 (1994) (collateral estoppel precludes a party from litigating identical issues that were necessarily decided on the merits in a former proceeding).

Finally, we note that “RICO was intended to combat organized crime, not to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to every tort plaintiff.” Oscar v. University Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992). Given the circumstances of this action, the district court correctly dismissed the RICO claim for failure to state a claim. See id.

B. Civil Rights Violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985 & 1986

We conclude for several reasons that the district court correctly dismissed Morda’s civil rights claims. First, Morda’s conclusory allegations that the private defendants Scott and Horspool conspired with county officials to assume conservatorship of the estate are insufficient to satisfy the tests for determining whether a private individual has acted under color of state law. See Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.) (claim of conspiracy under section 1983 must be supported by specific facts showing existence of conspiracy), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 599 & 113 S. Ct. 600 (1992).

Second, to the extent Morda’s action is based on actions taken solely by the defendant county officials, the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for section 1983 actions brought in California is one year. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 340(3). When a section 1983 action is based on a claim of conspiracy, the limitations period begins to run from the date of the last overt act. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). Here, it appears that the last overt act alleged to have been taken by the defendant city officials occurred in 1988. Because Morda filed his complaint more than one year later, on June 29, 1992, the district court did not err by dismissing this portion of his action as untimely.

Third, to the extent that Morda contends that his due process rights were violated during his state court proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review the matter. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986).

Finally, Morda’s claim under section 1985(3) fails because the complaint fails to allege that he is a member of a protected class. See Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1538 (9th Cir. 1992). Given our determination that Morda’s section 1985(3) claim was properly dismissed, dismissal of the section 1986 claim also was proper. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a section 1986 claim is dependent on a valid 1985(3) claim).2

AFFIRMED.