60 F.3d 833

MEMORANDUM**

Taxpayer Michael Samuel Fair appeals pro se the tax court’s summary judgment for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“CIR”) in Fair’s action contesting the CIR’s determinations of tax deficiencies and additions to tax for the tax years 1983, 1987, and 1988, and the tax court’s imposition of a $2,500 penalty for Fair’s filing of a frivolous petition. The CIR determined Fair’s tax deficiencies after Fair tardily filed his tax returns and failed to report income he received during the relevant tax years. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7482. We review de novo, Estate of Schnack v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1988), and we affirm.

Fair contends that he is a “free person” and not a “taxpayer” of the United States subject to federal income taxes. Fair also contends that wages he received for his labor during the relevant years are not income. These contentions lack merit.

Fair has failed to bear his burden of proving that the deficiencies in income tax and the additions to tax determined by the CIR were incorrect. See e.g., Rapp v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1985). First, Fair clearly is a “taxpayer” and a “person” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7203. See United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986). Second, it is well-settled that wages are income. See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 61; Grimes v. Commissioner, 806 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, “the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have both implicitly and explicitly recognized the Sixteenth Amendment’s authorization of a non-apportioned direct income tax on United States citizens residing in the United States and thus the validity of the federal income tax laws as applied to such citizens.” United States v. Nelson (In re Becraft), 885 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1989).

Fair also contends that the CIR issued several letters indicating that he did not need to file tax returns for the tax years at issue. Fair failed to raise this issue in the tax court. Issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal. See Grauvogel v. Commissioner, 768 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985).

Finally, to the extent Fair contends that the tax court erred by imposing a $2,500 penalty pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6673 for bringing a frivolous action, his contention lacks merit. For the reasons stated above, Fair’s action was frivolous. The tax court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the penalty. See Larsen v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

MEMORANDUM**

Jalal Kharrat, a native and citizen of Syria, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision, affirming the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum and withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1158(a) and 1253(h). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a), and we deny the petition.

Kharrat contends the the BIA erred by denying his request for asylum based on a fear of future persecution.1 This contention lacks merit.

Asylum applicants have the burden of establishing a fear of future persecution which is both genuine and reasonable. Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1993). Where the IJ draws conclusions regarding the applicant’s credibility, we give these conclusions substantial deference as long as they are “supported by a ‘specific, cogent reason’ for the disbelief.” Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Turcios V. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing IJ’s special competence to make credibility determinations).

Kharrat testified that while he was serving in the Syrian army in the early 1980’s, he was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization attempting to overthrow the government. The Syrian military detained Kharrat for approximately one month due to his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood and beat him so that he would provide information about the Brotherhood. After he was released, Kharrat remained in Syria for approximately one month, but eventually fled to France and then came to the United States. Kharrat testified that the Syrian government wants to kill him due to his prior involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood and because he deserted the Syrian army.

The IJ indicated that he had “considerable reservations” regarding Kharrat’s credibility. These reservations were based on Kharrat’s demeanor and evasiveness at his hearing as well as the inconsistencies and lack of detail in Kharrat’s testimony. The IJ also indicated that Kharrat’s persecution claim was undermined by his testimony that he had remained in Syria after being released from detention and suffered no additional persecution. Finally, the IJ concluded it was difficult to believe that the Syrian government still would want to kill Kharrat thirteen years after the events in question.

Echoing the IJ’s concerns regarding Kharrat’s credibility, the BIA affirmed the denial of Kharrat’s application for asylum. Because the IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for his adverse credibility determination, and because we find that Kharrat failed to meet his burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, we conclude that the IJ’s denial of Kharrat’s application for asylum based on a fear of future persecution was supported by substantial evidence. See Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1256-57; Turcios, 821 F.2d at 1399.2

PETITION DENIED.